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Abstract
Does economic globalization influence the positioning of parties and, as a consequence, the
ideological characteristics of party systems? Answering this question is important because
we need to understand the constraints that parties face in formulating policies from which
voters have to choose. In our paper, we take a systemic perspective and conceptualize a
party system’s ideological center of gravity as the outcome of interest. We define the center
of gravity as the weighted mean position of all parliamentary parties in a country that repre-
sents the position to which parties gravitate. We start by formulating static hypotheses on
the effect of imports and exports on the center of gravity and derive their underlying mecha-
nisms. We further derive dynamic hypotheses stipulating varying effects over time based on
the premise that partisan attitudes toward globalization have undergone multiple changes
over the last decades. A time-series cross-section analysis of 129 elections in 15 Western
European countries from 1974 to 2015 finds evidence for opposite effects of exports and
imports in the pooled data. Additionally, a moving-window analysis indicates that the rela-
tionship between globalization and the center of gravity varies over time. This is a significant
finding because it suggests that economic globalization has an influence on party systems
and that it is important to test for time-varying effects.
1 Introduction
Political parties made economic globalization possible by reducing barriers to the free flow of
goods and services [1]. However, did its promotion backfire by influencing the ways in which
parties position themselves on national and international economic issues and, as a conse-
quence, the ideological characteristics of party systems? There is extensive research on how
globalization is related to political, social and economic output and outcomes and party posi-
tioning [2–4], but there have been relatively few studies on its relationship with party systems.
Research on globalization effects on party positioning yields contradictory evidence. There is
evidence of an "efficiency effect" and rightward shifts of parties [5], probably moderated by the
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median voter [6], and for a "compensation effect" and leftward shifts of party positions [7, 8].
These studies present valuable insights, but they do not offer information on the systemic
effects of globalization because of the fallacies of inferring effects on party systems from globali-
zation effects on individual parties. The effects of economic globalization on party systems
work through the positioning of individual parties but, to study these effects, the empirical
analysis must center on party systems and cannot be inferred from a party-level analysis. An
analysis of the relationship between globalization, party positioning and their implications for
the characteristics of party systems is of societal importance. Economic globalization could
affect party positioning and, by implication, the ideological characteristics of party systems
and policies offered to voters on a systemic level. Depending on how globalization affects party
systems, it might indirectly and negatively shape citizen satisfaction with those parties and
with democracy as a whole [9].
In our paper, we take a systemic perspective, with a party system’s ideological center of grav-
ity as the outcome of interest. We define the center of gravity as the weighted mean position of
all parliamentary parties in a country. In section 2, we introduce the concept of the ideological
center of gravity and demonstrate that it is conceptually different from other measures com-
monly used in research on party systems. In section 3, we explain the way in which we decom-
pose ‘economic globalization’ into flows of imports and exports because the two dimensions
create different incentives for the positions taken by political parties. Initially, we formulate
static hypotheses on the effect of each globalization dimension on the center of gravity. We
continue by arguing that it is of crucial importance to take a dynamic perspective and trace
globalization effects over time, which, to our knowledge, has not yet been done in the party
politics literature on globalization. The rationale for a dynamic view is that the attitudes of par-
ties and the public toward globalization have, on multiple occasions, undergone massive
changes over the last decades, making it unlikely that there is a uniform effect of economic
globalization over time. We develop three hypotheses on how globalization affected the center
of gravity between the 1970s and early 2010s, which is our period of analysis.
We present our empirical strategy and data in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the results
of a time-series cross-section regression involving 129 elections from 15 Western European
democracies from 1974 to 2015. Our analysis includes the recent wave of globalization and
goes beyond previous studies that excluded the latest Euro crisis. The results point to the
advantages of supplementing a pooled, static analysis with a dynamic perspective. The results
for the pooled analysis fail to reject the null hypotheses of no effects for the two globalization
dimensions. This finding is in accord with previous research that, at best, found mixed results
for globalization effects on party positioning. In contrast, the disaggregated analysis supports
our argument that the association between the globalization dimensions and party systems
changes over time and includes significant and non-significant estimates of varying size. We
discuss the implications of our results in section 7 and make concluding remarks and discuss
our study’s limitations in section 8.
2 The ideological center of gravity of party systems
Our analysis focuses on party systems and their ideological center of gravity (henceforth
COG). Following conventional usage, we use ‘party ideology’ synonymously with a party’s
position on a dimension of party competition, which is the economic dimension in our paper.
That position depends on how the party positions itself on the issues or policies that constitute
the dimension [10]. Gross and Sigelman [11] introduced the COG as one element of party sys-
tems that has received scant attention compared to other measures such as fractionalization
and polarization [12]. We define the COG as the mean positioning of parties on a specific
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dimension, with party positions weighted by their vote shares. We use the vote share instead of
the parliamentary seat share to avoid distorting effects deriving from the disproportionality of
the electoral system. At the heart of our analysis is the economic dimension of party competi-
tion because this is where we expect to observe the consequences of economic globalization.
The COG conveys information about the hypothetical point on the economic dimension to
which parties gravitate. The COG is an important measure because it indicates whether parties
take positions such that the center is located more on the left, right or middle of the economic
dimension and the hypothetical point on the dimension from which voters can choose among
parties. We are aware of the argument that economic globalization made parties more respon-
sive on a non-economic or social dimension because of globalization constraints on their
behavior on the economic dimension [6, 13]. If this argument was true, there might still be
an effect of globalization on the COG on an economic dimension. The argument about the
decreasing room of maneuver is tied to the claim that party positions converge in a specific
range of the economic dimension and the COG should shift in response to globalization. Glob-
alization effects on party positioning on a social dimension, which are not our theoretical
interest, are therefore compatible with an effect of globalization on the COG.
Conceptually, the COG is distinct from polarization as an alternative and more widely stud-
ied metric of party systems and the convergence and divergence of party positions [8, 14].
Polarization measures the spread of party positions and the range of positions from which
voters can choose. The convergence or divergence of party positions captures whether the
diversity of party positions becomes broader or more narrow over time. Polarization and con-
vergence/divergence are important areas of study in their own right, but they are empirically
uninformative as to where the COG is located on the economic dimension. It is conceivable
that economic globalization is unrelated to polarization and convergence of party positions,
but causes parties to move, on average, to the right or left of the economic dimension, thus
affecting the policies from which voters can choose. In this perspective, the empirical analysis
of the COG is a complement to the study of polarization and convergence and necessary to
developing a more complete picture about the relationship between economic globalization
and party systems.
3 Formulation of hypotheses
3.1 Economic globalization and the center of gravity: Static perspective
We define economic globalization as the transborder flow of goods and investments and con-
ceptualize it as a multidimensional phenomenon [2]. These trade and capital flows are facili-
tated by low tariff and non-tariff barriers. We take a disaggregated perspective based on the
premise that there is no uniform globalization effect because different components of eco-
nomic globalization have different consequences for party systems. Our analysis centers on the
consequences of the flow of imports and exports. Compared to capital flows, trade flows are
the most apparent component of economic globalization and lead to greater scrutiny by voters
and parties [15]. The decision is supported by existing research finding no significant effect of
foreign direct investment (FDI) on party positioning [8]. Below, we will introduce capital
flows in the form of FDI as a robustness test. For the outcome, we focus on the economic
dimension because of empirical evidence that the policy space is not well-described by a single
left-right dimension and that an economic dimension is central to party competition in virtu-
ally all Western European countries ([16], chapters 5, 6).
The sum of total trade relative to the economic output is regularly used as a measure of
economic globalization (KOF index [17]). In contrast, we argue and then test the assumption
that it is necessary to decompose trade into imports and exports because they have different
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
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economic consequences for countries. These economic differences need to be examined and
understood because political parties holding different positions toward the national economy
respond differently to these national economic effects of globalization. We argue that the
actual responses of parties to this incentive differ due to the initially dissimilar positions that
parties occupy on the economic dimension. In the following discussion, we adhere to the con-
vention that smaller values on a dimension, as well as a negative correlation between a covari-
ate and the center of gravity, represent more leftish positions and changes.
The central premise of our hypotheses is that parties perceive imports negatively and
exports positively. The difference in the perceptions of imports and exports can be explained
in three ways, the first being derived from a standard political economy model of political sup-
port of organized groups [18, 19], which has previously been effectively applied to tariff mak-
ing and trade cooperation [20, 21]. Higher imports increase competitive pressure on domestic
companies producing goods that compete with imported goods (henceforth, “import-comp-
eters”). At the same time, they benefit domestic producers who require imports to serve as
inputs to their production process (henceforth, “input-users”) and consumers by lowering the
prices of the good. The unilateral reduction of tariffs might be welfare-enhancing, but it creates
political backlash because of the organized opposition of import-competers. In contrast,
input-users support higher import levels because it is to their advantage. Exporters, the third
organized group that is relevant here, are also interested in rising import levels in their home
countries. They follow the idea of reciprocity to leverage enhanced domestic market access for
easier foreign access and, thus, rising imports at home and abroad.
We argue that parties confronting this constellation of domestic groups target those groups’
interests with specific policy proposals. The negative perception of imports creates an incentive
for sheltering import-competers from imports by creating non-tariff barriers to trade as well
as supporting measures such as subsidies. A study by Kono [22] corroborates this reasoning by
showing that reduced tariff levels coincided with an increase in less visible non-tariff barriers
to trade. An example of the use of subsidies to reduce import competition is the agricultural
sector in many developed countries. Parties from both the left and right supported subsidizing
agricultural producers for an extended period of time to shelter them from import competi-
tion, at least to some degree. In the 1980s, for example, the European Community and the
United States were waging a “subsidy war” in the wheat sector that was costly to both sides and
came at the expense of exporters from third countries ([23] p. 153). With regard to the conse-
quences for party position taking, we argue that the incentive to favor protectionist leftist poli-
cies is stronger, the more parties are positioned to the right of the spectrum because parties on
the left are already endorsing the idea of sheltering national producers. Import levels should
therefore be negatively correlated with the COG.
The second mechanism works via the expectations of voters who feel more exposed to the
pressure of rising imports. Voters with jobs that are vulnerable to rising imports expect parties
to diminish their vulnerability, for example, by spending more on job training programs, etc.
or by increasing spending (compensation hypothesis [24]). A counterargument is that left par-
ties might also move more to the right of the economic dimension, reflecting their belief that
spending levels cannot be maintained under conditions of economic globalization (efficiency
hypothesis [25]). Our reasoning on the incentives for party positioning that work via voters
does not require that welfare spending or spending more generally increases, which is the tra-
ditional focus of the compensation hypothesis. Instead, we argue that parties have incentives
to offer policies that shelter voters from import competition, which might work in the same
way as for import-competers, i.e., by pursuing statist industrial policies such as granting subsi-
dies to industries. Trade policy making of the current Trump administration is an example of
the protection of workers in import-competing sectors without financial compensation or
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
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increased welfare spending. The steel sector, which faces strong competition, is simply pro-
tected by increased tariff levels that reduce the level of imports and (supposedly) save jobs in
the US steel industry. Following this argument, parties that are located on the left have already
assumed a position that is in accord with the demand for higher compensation, whatever form
it might take. The further a party is located to the right, the stronger the incentive to adjust its
position and make a move to the left to compete for compensation-demanding voters.
A third possible mechanism is a mercantilist understanding of trade policy making. Mer-
cantilism is long outdated among economists [26], but one can observe mercantilist thinking
over the past 200 years until the present. Countries that import more than they export run cur-
rent account deficits, which are traditionally considered to be undesirable because they are
thought to be a sign of economic weakness [15]. Current account deficits and surpluses have
been a salient issue since the beginning of modern trade relations in the 19th century [27] and
were also central to the recent Euro crisis. Germany has been running an account surplus
since the mid-2000s and has lauded this as a sign of Germany’s economic strength and a role
model for struggling countries such as Greece and Portugal [28]. This reasoning reflects the
view that export surpluses equal strength and that high levels of imports are bad for an econ-
omy (which does not make sense in economic terms, but that is another matter). The policy
implications of mercantilism are to make import-competers more competitive because the
stronger they are, the less goods will be imported.
We argue that the mechanisms should hold in times of increasing international division of
labor and a shift from inter-industry to intra-industry trade. If one perceives imports as an
indication of domestic economic weakness or as a threat to the support of import-competers,
it does not matter whether goods are traded on an inter-industry or intra-industry level. For
example, this is reflected in the mercantilist move by the current Trump administration, the
arguments of pro-Brexit groups who wanted to retake control over trade relations and imports
and the support of German car manufacturers by the German government, that repeatedly
and with different partisan composition prevented the regulation of emissions in the EU
Council of Ministers.
Hypothesis 1: Increasing levels of imports are associated with a leftward shift of the center of
gravity and decreasing levels of imports with a rightward shift on the economic dimension of
party competition.
In contrast to imports, we find that exports are welcomed by all parties because they benefit
exporters, who increase their support for parties strengthening the exporter’s competitiveness
[29]. Workers employed by exporters also benefit from higher exports because that secures
their jobs and increases their income. The agricultural industry is a case in point for these
arguments because, for decades, developed countries have implemented export promotion
programs to support their producers ([30], p. 116). From a mercantilist perspective, exports
are desirable simply because they contribute to a current account surplus.
These points at least hold for developed economies that export manufactured products and
services, although it might differ for developing countries predominantly exporting primary
goods or those that export rare goods such as the minerals needed in the telecommunications
industry. However, our theoretical arguments are confined to developed economies. Exports
have been interpreted this way from the inception of the trade doctrine of mercantilism until
the present day [15], including the Euro crisis wherein the ailing states were blamed for a lack
of economic competitiveness and weak export industries. We assume that parties agree on the
need to support exporters via appropriate policies, whereas the exact policies that are favored
depend on whether a party is positioned on the left or right side of the political spectrum.
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
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Following theories on partisan ideology and economic policy making [31, 32], we argue that
parties located more to the right of the spectrum endorse supply-side policies such as lower
corporate taxes and deregulation of the labor market. Parties on the left embrace demand-side
policies that are unsuitable for the support for exporters. Instead, they seek to shelter domestic
producers from import competition via tariff and non-tariff barriers because of their belief
that less competition at home means enhanced competitiveness abroad [33]. Another means
by which parties can promote exports are subsidies, which are also an instrument of the politi-
cal left, either in the form of export subsidies or subsidies specifically targeted at domestic pro-
ducers [34]. In contrast to lower taxes and less regulation, subsidies represent an intervention
of the state into the market and are not an element of supply-side politics.
Following this reasoning, leftist and rightist parties are already located on the proper sides
of the spectrum, “proper” meaning that the current position is largely in line with the incen-
tives created by exports. When exports increase, we expect parties located on the left to either
remain stationary or move more to the left, on average, while parties on the right either stay
put or shift further to the right. We therefore hypothesize that the rightward shifts of rightist
parties and leftward shifts of leftist parties cancel each other out, with the consequence that the
ideological center of gravity remains in place.
Hypothesis 2: Changes in the level of exports are unrelated with a party system’s center of
gravity on the economic dimension of party competition.
We do not argue that all parties held uniform views on economic globalization during these
periods (the same holds for the hypotheses we develop in the following section). However, we
believe that it is possible to develop arguments applicable to many, in particular, the major
European parties that have more weight for a party system’s COG.
3.2 Economic globalization and the center of gravity: Dynamic perspective
Economic globalization has been a contested issue among the public, politicians and organized
groups since the beginning of the modern globalization era in the mid-19th century [15]. We
expect the two static hypotheses to hold in an aggregate analysis pooling the data from multiple
decades because these should be, on average, a relationship between imports, exports and the
COG. However, we also believe that it is important to take a dynamic perspective based on the
assumption that the parties’ view on and responses to imports and exports have changed over
time. One could choose any four decades from 1860, which is usually seen as the starting point
of modern trade relations [35], and would observe at least one major change in economic glob-
alization and how countries perceived and responded to it (see for example, [15]).
This general empirical insight motivates the formulation of multiple dynamic hypotheses
for our period of analysis, which ranges from 1974 to 2015. We divide it into three stages
according to our expectation of Western European parties’ responses to imports and exports.
The expectations and hypotheses are derived from existing research on partisan behavior dur-
ing these four decades and our own perspective on the empirical developments. We are unable
to precisely determine the breakpoints between the three periods because policy beliefs seam-
lessly supersede one another. However, we think that it is possible to determine the approxi-
mate beginning and end of a stage. The empirical analysis of the dynamic hypotheses is a
moving-window analysis that does not require a sharp differentiation between the three
periods.
The first stage ranges from the 1960s to the mid-1980s. This period is characterized by the
economic problems of the 1960s and 1970s, which became manifest in the budget and
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945 February 27, 2019 6 / 26
currency problems of the United States [36], the end of the Bretton Woods system, the two oil
crises and the economic stagnation combined with high inflation that existed until the early
1980s. Keynesian demand policies, which are inward-oriented and seek to stimulate domestic
demand via public deficit spending, prevailed during the 1970s among left parties [37]. At the
same time, parties on the right of the spectrum started leaning toward monetarist policies. The
Reagan administration initiated the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which set the precedent for cut-
ting the top marginal income tax rates in many Western European countries [38]. On the
international level, it would be appropriate to include the GATT Tokyo Round, but that only
achieved moderate progress because states were cautious about pushing forward liberalization
in difficult economic times [39]. Taken together, we argue that the positions of leftist and
rightist parties in the 1970s and early 1980s were driven by the motivations that we previously
laid out for the static hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: Levels of exports are not associated with the center of gravity between the 1970s
and the mid-1980s.
Imports were seen negatively by all parties in difficult economic times, who sought to
counter them with leftist, protectionist measures and account for a negative association
between imports and the COG. For example, Western countries used their superior political
and economic power to protect their textiles industry against the upcoming competition of
developing countries by negotiating import quotas and voluntary export restraints for textile
exports [40].
Hypothesis 4: Levels of imports are negatively associated with the center of gravity between the
1970s and the mid-1980s.
The late 1980s and 1990s represented a turning point because left parties, social-democratic
and socialist parties in particular, started embracing monetarist and supply-side policies [41].
One can date the peak of this period of moderation to the late 1990s and early 2000s ([42],
p. 801), when leftist governments in Europe pursued “The Third Way”, lowered corporate
taxes and engaged in cutbacks of the state in a manner not previously conceivable. For exam-
ple, in a series of reforms, Labour raised the bar for the receipt of welfare state benefits to
increase pressure on the unemployed to find a job ([43], p. 84). Regardless of party ideology,
parties endorsed the idea of privatizing state-owned monopolists in a wide range of sectors,
including aviation, postal services and telecommunication [44, 45].
Because parties on the left and right endorsed supply-side policies, liberalization and
increased economic globalization during this period, we expect that the link between imports
and exports and the COG was most pronounced between the mid-1980s and early 2000s. Par-
ties on the right also reflected a changed attitude towards globalization by taking more radical
positions and pushing for stronger retrenchment of the state and lower taxes than did the left
parties [46]. For the period between the mid-1980s and early 2000s, we hypothesize that a posi-
tive association between exports and the COG existed because both left parties and right par-
ties pursued supply-side policies with the goal of stimulating them.
Hypothesis 5: Between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, the association between levels of
exports and the center of gravity is positive.
With regard to imports, we expect that the negative association is stronger in the second
period than in the first. A strengthening negative effect is a direct consequence of economic
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
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liberalization and globalization because it stimulated exports and economic integration. Since
trade liberalization is usually reciprocal, countries have to buy an increase in exports by accept-
ing higher levels of imports [33]. Import-competers feel increased pressure from rising
imports and voters become increasingly vulnerable to tougher competition, making them sus-
ceptible to more radical parties that propose protectionist policies (economic nationalism, [47,
48]). We argue that left and right parties did not become blind to producers and voters
exposed to import competition and endorse policies that at least partially compensate for the
increased exposure that parties expected to follow due to import competition [24]. As Kono
[22] shows, measures of protection and support that are less visible than tariffs increase when
tariffs decrease. Tariff cuts and higher levels of imports more generally therefore do not auto-
matically imply that parties stand by and watch when competition increases for import-comp-
eters. Two examples for a demand-side policy that is aimed at workers that falls right in the
high days of economic integration and liberalization in the second period is the introduction
of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom (1999) and Ireland (2000) [49]. We therefore the-
orize that higher imports shift the COG to the left in the second period and that the effect is
stronger than in the first period.
Hypothesis 6: Between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, the association between levels of
imports and the center of gravity is more negative than in the first period.
The stock market crash and economic downturn of the early 2000s constrained national
budgets and marked a turning point in attitudes toward economic liberalization among the
public and parties. On the international level, the adverse economic development and demise
of liberalization were foreshadowed by public protests against a continuation of economic
globalization, for example, in Genoa in 2001, and the failure to successfully conclude the so-
called Doha Round [50]. The comparatively low-interest rate policies of central banks aimed at
supporting economic growth in Western countries then contributed to the second stock mar-
ket crash in the late 2000s [51], which lead to increased skepticism to economic liberalization
and deregulation. We argue that, during that decade, leftist parties reversed their attitudes and
turned again to demand-side policies and away from supply-side policies ([52], chapter 6).
Parties in the right spectrum could ignore neither the changed economic environment nor
public attitudes toward globalization and we expect that they had to moderate their position as
well. Take the case of Denmark, for example: In November 2001, the right-wing liberal Venstre
party won the general election, formed a minority government with the Conservative People’s
Party and governed until 2011. Under two prime ministers, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Lars
Løkke Rasmussen, there were no significant reforms of the welfare state, and their public
spending exceeded that of the Social Democratic previous government [53].
We expect the financial crisis that started in 2007 further affects the COG in three ways that
are specific to this period. First, the need to bail out banks to avoid bankruptcy meant that
countries nationalized or subsidized them ([52], chapter 6), which are traditionally left issues.
This was a quick response of parties regardless of their ideology, which we believe to be
reflected in the positions of parties in the late 2000s and early 2010s to some degree. Alto-
gether, this should move all parties more to the left. Second, in the medium run, the financial
crisis spurred attempts to more tightly re-regulate the financial sector and at least partially
reverse the liberalization measures taken in the 1990s and early 2000s. Third, the financial cri-
sis of 2007, bailouts of banks and austerity policies in some countries contributed to the forma-
tion of new and strengthening of existing populist parties on the left and right of the spectrum.
Left-wing and right-wing populist parties differ in many respects, but have in common that
they favor economic nationalism. A key element of economic nationalism is to reduce imports
Economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems
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by raising barriers to trade as classic left policy positions [54]. While economically nationalist
parties on the left and right have protectionism and economic radicalism in common [55], we
expect them to differ in their attitudes toward exports. Exports are compatible with economic
nationalism because it is not equivalent with autarchy and the left-right differences between
left-wing and right-wing parties should matter here in the ways we have theorized.
Because of these developments, we argue for the third period that the relationship between
imports, exports and the COG is again becoming more similar to the relationship in the first
period. Existing, non-populist parties were confronted with the consequences of the financial
crises of the early 2000s and 2007, seen as a result of the liberalization progress in the previous
decade, and returned to what could be called their traditional policies. This development is
complemented by the formation and rise of economically nationalist parties that seek protec-
tionist measures against imports.
Hypothesis 7: Since the early 2000s, the association between levels of exports and imports and
the center of gravity is positive and attenuating compared to the second period.
Table 1 summarizes the expected effects of exports and imports on the ideological center of
gravity of party systems.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is derived from the Manifesto Project Database (MARPOR) data [56].
MARPOR is based on human codings of party platforms and assigns quasi-sentences to fifty-
six policy categories, plus one category for non-assignable quasi-sentences. These are divided
by the number of all quasi-sentences to measure the percentage of all quasi-sentences for each
category. We use the percentages to estimate the party position on an economic dimension. In
Table 2, we compare existing constructions of the economic dimension of party competition
[57–61].
The comparison shows a large intersecting set, with all categories being used belonging to
MARPOR domains four, five and seven. Not one of the 21 categories that is coded right by one
approach is coded as left by another, or vice versa. However, the different choices of categories
for the measurement of party positions reflect that theory does not dictate the choice of one
specific set of items. Because of this uncertainty, we decided to follow a maximum approach
toward the measurement of party positions on an economic dimension. The maximum
approach builds the union of all 21 categories that have been used in one of the five studies to
measure party positions. Conceptually, we find this approach defensible because each of the 21
categories can be plausibly linked to the economic dimension of party competition.
We follow customary practice and derive a position estimate by subtracting left from right
percentages. A drawback of building the difference is that the estimate is not “independent of
Table 1. Hypotheses—Expected effects of globalization variables on the COG.
Exports Imports
Pooled effect o −
Time-variant effects
1970s—mid 1980s o −
mid 1980s—early 2000s + + − −
2000s + −
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.t001
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irrelevant alternatives” because changes in the number of quasi-sentences not feeding directly
into the economic position estimate might affect that estimate ([61], p. 91). We address this
problem and standardize the difference between right and left number by dividing it with the
sum of the right and left percentages: (R-L)/(R+L) [62].
A simple example illustrates the advantage of the ratio measure: For a party manifesto that
only consists of 60 right and 20 left quasi-sentences, the right and left percentages are 75 and
25 and the position estimate 50 on a scale from -100 to +100. The standardized measure is 0.5
on a scale ranging from -1 to +1. Now imagine the party adds 20 new quasi-sentences that are
neither right nor left on the economic dimension. The non-adjusted difference is 40 (60–20),
meaning the party would be estimated to be slightly more centrist, although neither the right
nor left content of the manifesto changed. In contrast, the ratio is unaffected by the 20 new
sentences because their number remains constant and we again estimate a position at 0.5. We
decided against a logit transformation of right and left quasi-sentences [63]. Our procedure
takes the same problem into account as the logit transformation, but we find it more intuitive.
Because of the importance of the economic dimension and the relatively high number of
quasi-sentences underlying it, there is also no need to smoothen estimates to address low num-
bers of quasi-sentences.
Under certain circumstances, the use of the ratio measure can generate undesired results:
The fewer the number of included items is, the easier it can lead to very polarized scales. A
manifesto with one or only few right issues and no left issues receives the extreme score of +1.
To take that scenario into account it is reasonable to include the highest number of issues that
are clearly attributable to either left or right economic policy positions. We therefore continue
Table 2. Comparison of economic dimension of party competition variables.
Laver/ Budge Benoit/ Laver Tavits Bakker/ Hobolt Prosser max
Right Categories
401 Free Market Economy x x x x x x
402 Incentives: Positive x x x x x
407 Protectionism: Negative x x x x x x
410 Economic Growth: Positive x x
414 Economic Orthodoxy x x x x x x
505 Welfare State Limitation x x x x x
507 Education Limitation x x x
702 Labour Groups: Negative x x x
Left Categories
403 Market Regulation x x x x x x
404 Economic Planning x x x x x
405 Corporatism / Mixed Economy x x x
406 Protectionism: Positive x x x x x
409 Keynesian Demand Management x x
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive x x
412 Controlled Economy x x x x x x
413 Nationalisation x x x x x
415 Marxist Analysis x x
503 Equality: Positive x x x
504 Welfare State Expansion x x x x
506 Education Expansion x x x x
701 Labour Groups: Positive x x x x
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.t002
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with our “broad” definition of the economic party positions. Table 3 shows the correlations of
equally-constructed economic left-right measures that are based on the different selections of
categories shown in Table 2. The strength of the correlations ranges from moderate to very
high levels. In a robustness analysis we report below, we test whether the empirical results
depend on the choice of measurement approach.
We calculate the COG of a country at time t by weighting the position of each parliamen-
tary party on the economic dimension, derived with the maximum approach, with its vote
share and taking the sum over the weighted positions. The range of the center lies between -1
and +1 from left to right. Fig 1 presents the development of the COG for the 15 countries and
period of analysis that we cover with our study. The figure demonstrates that, both within and
between countries, the COG fluctuates over time, which is the variation we seek to exploit. The
mean COG across all observations is -0.48, which partially reflects that the economic dimen-
sion includes more left than right categories. The line plot might overstate the number of
observations per country, which is equal to or less than nine for nine countries out of fifteen.
Detrending the imports and exports variables is therefore not warranted [64].
4.2 Main covariates
We operationalize ‘economic globalization’ via measures of capital and trade flows and use
data extracted from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” [65]. We measure the
export and import dimension with exports and imports of goods and services standardized
with the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. We lag the globalization variables by one
year to account for a temporal lag of the potential effects.
4.3 Additional covariates
We add a public opinion measure as a control variable because parties have been found to be
responsive to public opinion and the median voter [66], which might have follow-up effects
for the COG. We calculate the mean self-reported left-right position of respondents in the
Eurobarometer as a measure for the mean voter position. Empirical studies show that the
mean voter and mean citizen position are almost perfectly correlated [67], allowing their syn-
onymous use. Since there is no time-series cross-section data allowing us to calculate the mean
voter position on the economic dimension, we must rely on public opinion data that locate
respondents on the main left-right dimension. The economic dimension and main dimension
are strongly correlated in some countries and only weakly in others ([16]), chapter 4, 5], mean-
ing that the public opinion variable is likely to contain measurement error. The public opinion
variable is lagged by one year. If more than one Eurobarometer wave was available per year,
we pooled data from multiple waves before calculating the mean voter position. We use GDP
growth as a control for a country’s economic development. The willingness to implement sup-
ply-side reforms increases, the worse the economic situation. GDP per capita controls for the
Table 3. Correlation matrix for different ratio measures.
max Laver/ Budge Benoit/ Laver Tavits Bakker/ Hobolt Prosser
max 1
Laver/Budge 0,4543 1
Benoit/Laver 0,8989 0,5378 1
Tavits 0,4825 0,9658 0,5526 1
Bakker/Hobolt 0,9711 0,4719 0,9173 0,4991 1
Prosser 0,8800 0,4163 0,8584 0,4365 0,8132 1
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.t003
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level of economic development because more developed countries might have a more leftist
center due to an increased focus on postmaterialist values in the electorate as opposed to mate-
rialism [68]. All control variables are lagged by one year.
In total, our data comprises 129 observations from elections in 15 countries from 1974 to
2015. We aimed to maximize the spatio-temporal coverage of our data with a focus on Europe
to have sufficient power for the moving-window analysis. The main data constraint derives
from the availability of the economic variables and the Eurobarometer data. An overview of
the variables, operationalization and sources as well as a list of included elections is included in
the supporting information (see S1 and S2 Tables as well as S1 Fig). Descriptive statistics for
key and control variables are shown in Table 4. See S7 Table for descriptive statistics of the
KOF indices that we use below.
4.4 Empirical strategy
We first focus on the time-invariant hypotheses with ordinary least-squares regression (OLS).
A test for first-order serial autocorrelation rejects the null of no autocorrelation. A test for sec-
ond-order autocorrelation fails to reject the null. Two F-tests for country fixed-effects and year
Fig 1. Center of gravity for 15 countries for our period of analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g001
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fixed- effects fail to reject the null of no fixed effects. Based on the diagnostics, we decided to
estimate an OLS regression with a lagged dependent variable and standard errors clustered by
countries and years. The test for first-order serial autocorrelation when the lagged dependent
variable is included fails to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Although the F-
tests indicate that there is no unobserved heterogeneity between or within countries, we opted
for the two-way clustering of standard errors because the panel structure of the data makes it
plausible to argue that errors are correlated on both dimensions [69]. Clustered standard
errors have been shown to be superior to fixed effects when the unobserved effect varies
instead of being constant, which we find plausible in an analysis covering four decades [70].
The following analysis is completely documented in a Stata log-file (S1 File).
5 Analysis of time-invariant hypotheses
We present the estimates for imports and exports in Fig 2 and present the full regression
results in Table 5, column 1. The estimate for imports is negative and significant at 0.05 and
allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no association. The estimate for exports is positive
Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Economic COG -0.4847 0.1811 -0.7856 0.1574 129
Exports (% GDP) 43.56 29.53 14.43 189.24 129
Imports (% GDP) 42.18 23.70 16.89 159.36 129
Public Opinion 5.3428 0.4137 4.3883 6.3902 129
GDP growth (%) 2.0877 2.7025 -9.1325 9.2690 129
GDP/capita (thsd USD) 24,066 17,523 2,923 112,852 129
Trade Balance (% GDP) 1.3749 7.7344 -14.2083 30.3527 129
FDI net inflows (% GDP) 4.8279 14.2971 -3.6792 142.2570 116
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.t004
Fig 2. Marginal effect and 95% confidence interval for key independent variables. n = 129; OLS model with two-
way clustered standard errors and lagged DV.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g002
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and significant at 0.01, unexpectedly leading us to reject hypothesis 2 stipulating no association
between export levels and the COG. Both estimates have in common that the confidence inter-
val is relatively wide and the uncertainty large.
Estimates for alternative specifications that confirm the results in Fig 2 are presented in
Table 5 and S3 Table. S3 Table shows that the results are robust to using different measure-
ment approaches of party positions on the economic dimension. For each of the five previously
used measurement approaches we summarized in Table 2, we get significant and negative esti-
mates for imports and significant and positive estimates for exports. As a further robustness
test, we included foreign direct investment (FDI) as an independent variable. We measure it
via the net inflows of FDI relative to GDP. We do not expect systematic adjustments of party
positions in response to changes in FDI flows because of their lower salience in the public dis-
course and political competition and lower economic salience. This argument can be stressed
with the comparison of the relative size of exports (in our sample on average 44% of GDP) and
imports (42% of GDP) with the FDI net inflows (on average 5% of GDP with Luxembourg
being an outlier). The inclusion of FDI net inflows reduces the number of available elections
from 129 to 116. The effects for exports and imports are robust to the inclusion of FDI and the
effects for FDI are small and statistically undistinguishable from zero in pooled and time-vari-
ant analyses (see below). We further observe that the results are robust to the estimation of
panel-correct standard errors [71].
The parallel development of imports and exports in some countries (S2 Fig) hints at a mul-
ticollinearity problem when using both as covariates in the same model. The visual impression
is supported by a variance inflation factor (VIF) for the import variable and export variable
higher than conventional maximum of 10. The VIF is 35 for exports and 32 for the import
Table 5. Regression results for baseline model and alternative specifications.
Two-way base FDI PCSE Trade balance
Imports -0.0064� -0.0073�� -0.0064��
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023)




Median voter 0.0876� 0.0780� 0.0876� 0.0756�
(0.0350) (0.0313) (0.0430) (0.0381)
GDP growth -0.0218��� -0.0214��� -0.0218��� -0.0224���
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0033)
GDP/capita -0.0000�� -0.0000�� -0.0000�� -0.0000���
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lagged DV 0.3442��� 0.3177��� 0.3442��� 0.3584���
(0.0531) (0.0595) (0.1011) (0.0570)
Trade balance 0.0047�
(0.0020)
Constant -0.6347�� -0.5846�� -0.6347�� -0.5842��
(0.1936) (0.1786) (0.2220) (0.2150)
R2 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.39
N 129 116 129 129
Standard errors in parentheses; two-sided tests; p < .05 �; p < .01 ��; p < .001 ���.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.t005
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variable. Two variables do contain less information, the higher their degree of collinearity and
the less precise the estimate of the coefficient becomes. In this perspective, it is a positive find-
ing that the estimates for imports and exports are significant. However, a high degree of multi-
collinearity also has the potential to render estimates highly sensitive to minor changes in the
data ([72], p. 11). As a first robustness test reported in the last column of Table 5, we replace
the imports and exports variables with a trade balance variable subtracting imports from
exports. This eliminates the multicollinearity problem and follows the recommendation to
aggregate collinear variables ([72], pp. 14–15). Following our theoretical arguments, we expect
a positive correlation between the trade balance and the COG because a higher level of exports
relative to imports should, on average, move parties to the right on the economic dimension.
The estimate for the trade balance variable is positive and significant at 0.05.
As a second robustness test, we run the baseline model with case-wise and country-wise
deletion. The size and direction of estimates for imports and exports are not sensitive to delet-
ing cases or countries because the point estimates have little variance and the sign of the esti-
mate is always the same. This is an important finding because it indicates that collinearity does
not induce sensitivity of the estimates to minor (case-wise deletion) and not so minor (coun-
try-wise deletion) changes of the data. We take this as evidence that multicollinearity does not
undermine the interpretability of our estimates for imports and exports.
With regard to the significance of the estimates, for imports, we observe that one estimate
out of 129 is not significant at .05. This is not evidence of non-robustness because we should
expect one non-significant estimate just by chance (S3 Fig). All 129 estimates are significant
for exports (S4 Fig). When we estimate the models without Greece (no. 7) or Ireland (no. 8),
the estimates for imports and exports cease to be significant at .05 and only achieve signifi-
cance at .10 (S5 and S6 Figs). The point estimates are in the same narrow range as for the other
models and substantively identical. Greece contributes the largest number of observations to
the analysis (n = 15) and its exclusion reduces the efficiency of the estimates most, which is evi-
denced by having the greatest confidence interval. Ireland adds eleven cases to the analysis,
which equals about nine percent of the total number of cases. We argue that this does not
reflect fundamental problems with the inclusion of either of the two countries, but that the
estimates lack precision because of collinearity (see above) and because removing 10–15 cases
from a sample of 129 cases can make an important difference for statistical significance at a
level of .05. At the request of a reviewer, we also estimated one-way and two-way fixed effects
models that we discuss in the appendix (S4 Table).
6 Analysis of time-variant hypotheses
We test hypotheses 3 to 7 with a moving-window analysis estimating the OLS regression with
two-way clustered standard and a lagged DV for subsets of the total period of analysis (Fig 3).
Each window covers 20 years and is moved forward by one year, taking 1974 as the starting
point. The number of observations increases from 53 for the first window up to 68 for the last
window because data availability improves for more recent periods. We do not control for
multiple testing because the windows have been determined in an exploratory manner as their
size and number do not follow from theory. The results are robust to changes in the size and
number of windows.
The charts show that the association between imports and exports and the COG varies over
time. The marginal effects are close to zero for the early windows, gradually becoming more
negative for imports and more positive for exports. This confirms hypothesis 3 stipulating a
non-association between exports and the COG in the first part of our period of analysis. The
findings do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis for imports, contradicting hypothesis 4
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stipulating a negative association between imports and the COG. In the early 1980s, the associ-
ations between imports, exports and the COG become statistically distinguishable from zero
and have the expected direction, yielding evidence in line with hypotheses 5 (positive effects
for exports) and 6 (negative effects for imports) for the second period. The estimates decrease
in size and become non-significant again at the end of the third period. Hypothesis 7, stipulat-
ing attenuating positive respectively negative effects for exports and imports in the 2000s can
be confirmed. We again take multicollinearity problems into account and replace imports
and exports with the trade balance variable. The results confirm the findings we present here
(S7 Fig).
We derived the hypotheses on the time-varying effect of imports and exports from the
assumption that the attitudes of parties toward economic globalization changed over the past
four decades. Since we are not able to measure these attitudes directly, we test two additional
observable implications that should find empirical support if globalization attitudes varied
over time. We argue that parties of the right and the left in particular assumed more positive
attitudes from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s. Globalization skepticism then increased
again because of the stock market crash of 2000 and the economic downturn. If this is correct,
we should observe a reduction of barriers to trade and financial flows that lasted until the early
2000s and an increase in impediments to trade and finance thereafter. The implication is
based on the argument that attitudes do not only drive party positioning, but also actual policy
making. We visually assess this implication by plotting the KOF de jure index for economic
globalization over time and trace its development with a Lowess smoother (Fig 4) [73]. For the
KOF data, we always present the variable lagged by one year. Higher numbers on the index
reflect lower barriers to trade and finance flows. In this analysis, we cannot link any data
point to the rationales of a specific left or right party. However, we believe that the data are still
indicative because of variation in the partisan composition of governments and parliaments
Fig 3. Estimates for imports and exports over time. Numbers next to confidence intervals are observations per
regression.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g003
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between countries and within countries over time. This variation rules out, for example, that
increases in liberalization are exclusively attributable to rightist parties while declining liberal-
ization is solely attributable to leftist parties. The development of de jure economic globaliza-
tion follows the expected pattern, with a globalization bump around 2000 and a decrease to a
de jure globalization level that is similar to the level of the mid-1980s. S8 Fig shows that de jure
trade and financial globalization follow the same pattern, with the decline in finance being
larger than in trade.
The second observable implication is related to the first and focuses on two other globaliza-
tion dimensions. If attitudes toward economic globalization changed over time, we should not
see the same pattern of a bump around 2000 for de jure political and social globalization. This
implication can be conceived of as an informal placebo test because we do not expect to see the
pattern for outcomes other than de jure economic globalization. Fig 5 demonstrates that de
jure globalization in the political and social domains follows different patterns. All three
domains have increases at the globalization level since the mid-1980s in common. In contrast
to economic globalization, political and social de jure globalization keep their level until the
end of our period of analysis. The difference in the development of de jure globalization in eco-
nomics and the other two domains lends additional credence to our argument about time-
varying attitudes toward economic globalization.
7 Discussion
The empirical results show that economic globalization is associated with the development of a
party system’s center of gravity, but the link is different across dimensions of globalization and
time. We summarize our findings in Table 6 and compare them with the hypotheses we for-
mulated in Section 3. The two hypotheses that fail to be supported concern the static hypothe-
sis for exports and the hypothesis on imports during the first of our three periods. Our
Fig 4. KOF economic globalization index, de jure (one-year lag). Lowess smoother, bandwith = 0.5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g004
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hypothesis on the absence of an effect of exports on the COG was based on the premise that
both the parties on the left and right value rising exports, but promote them with different pol-
icies, which results in no significant change of the COG on the systematic level. The positive
effect of exports suggests that this premise is incorrect. Three non-exclusive reasons can
account for this. First, left and right parties propose different policies to foster exports and
right parties do this more strongly than left parties, leading to a rightward shift of the COG. A
possible reason for this could be that exporting companies might be more influential and more
often among the constituency of right parties, which therefore seek export-promoting polices
more than left parties. Second, contrary to the compensation hypothesis, changing expecta-
tions of voters are also conceivable: Workers in the export sectors who benefit from rising
exports by occupying high-skilled jobs and rising wages could demand policies fostering the
reason for their economic success that are picked up by party platforms. Third, left parties and
right parties might pursue similar, supply-side policies when it comes to the promotion of
exports.
Fig 5. De jure social and political globalization (one-year lag). Lowess smoother, bandwith = 0.5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g005
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The failure to reject the null hypothesis of no effects of imports on the COG during the first
period of analysis can be attributed to the bad state of the world economy in the mid-1970s
and early 1980s. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and looming problems of the
world economy in the early 1970s might have led to a leftward shift of the COG in the years
before the start of our period of analysis and that we expected to happen in the late 1970s.
Once left and right parties adjusted their positions leftward because of undesired imports dur-
ing bad economic times, there was then ideological stagnation during the first subperiod of
analysis until economic globalization took off since the mid-1980s. We find this explanation
most plausible because it is not obvious to us why parties that traditionally see imports as
something negative would not react by becoming more protectionist during economic
downturns.
We enhance the substantive interpretation of the estimates by plotting the predicted COG
and 95% confidence interval for levels of imports ranging from 20% to 70% in steps of 5%. S2
Fig shows that this is the range of import levels for most countries. We fix the exports variable
at a value of 50%. This gives us a conservative predicted COG because exports have the oppo-
site effect on the COG than imports. The predicted COG moves from about -0.31, which is
predicted with large uncertainty, to about -0.63, which is predicted with higher precision (Fig
6). We take this to be a substantively significant effect because imports have been continuously
growing in our period of observation.
Fig 7 presents the equivalent plot for export levels and import levels fixed at 50%. The pre-
dicted COG becomes more centrist as the level of exports increases, but the level of the COG is
lower for the equivalent level of imports. The predicted COG is about -0.67 for export levels of
20% and at about -0.63 for import levels of 70%. The same holds for the opposite end of the
spectrum, with a prediction of about -0.38 for the maximum level of exports, 70%, and of
about -0.31 for the lower level of imports. In comparison and based on the larger absolute
Fig 6. Predicted center of gravity for imports for export level of 50%.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g006
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estimate for imports (see Table 5), imports have a slightly stronger effect on the COG, leading
us to expect a more leftist COG than equivalent levels of exports.
We conclude the discussion by addressing potential problems of endogeneity, reverse cau-
sation and identification. First, economic globalization is not a force of nature, but has been
made possible by political decisions [1]. This might create concerns about endogeneity
between trade and investment flows and party positions and reverse causation according to
which parties first change their position [74], with systemic consequences for the COG, and
then reduce barriers to trade. We believe that these are not problems for our analysis because
most liberalization measures have been negotiated under the auspices of international institu-
tions such as the GATT or in regional or bilateral trade treaties [21, 75]. These agreements
phase-in trade and investment liberalization measures, for example, by gradually reducing a
tariff over multiple years instead of making a huge cut in one year [76]. In addition, economic
actors need to adjust to such phased-in measures and trade and investment flows follow these
changes with a certain degree of delay. For this reason, trade and investment flows at year t
should be explained with partisan positions during the negotiations of an agreement and be
unrelated to the positions that parties took in the year t-1. An additional reason speaking
against endogeneity and reverse causation is that most countries in our data have been mem-
bers of the EU for the greatest part of the period of analysis. Since the 1960s, the Commission
of the EU has been negotiating trade treaties on behalf of its member states, implying that the
liberalization measures and downstream effects on trade and investment flows are not directly
influenced by the positions of parties. The Commission of the EU is in contact with the gov-
ernments of its member states. Because of the large number of member states and the fact that
many governments are coalition governments, the bargaining position of the Commission is,
if at all, a compromise of the individual party positions. This breaks the link between any indi-
vidual party position, the final negotiation outcome and downstream economic effects.
Fig 7. Predicted center of gravity for exports for import level of 50%.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212945.g007
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Second, an alternative interpretation for our findings is that there might be different effects
of imports and exports, but they only mask broader globalization effects that we cannot cap-
ture with a disaggregated perspective. We use the KOF de facto globalization index as an inde-
pendent variable to test whether there are general effects of economic globalization [73]. The
de facto dimension of economic globalization has the two subdimensions, ‘trade globalization’
and ‘financial globalization’, comprising a total of eight variables (see [77, 78]). We run four
models with the economic globalization index, the trade index, the financial index and the
trade and finance index combined. In each model, the index or indices replace the import,
export and FDI variables (S5 Table). None of the index estimates are significant in any of the
four models and we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of aggregated globalization effects
on party systems. There might be aggregate effects that are smaller than those we can detect
with our data, but we take this as supporting evidence for a disaggregated perspective on indi-
vidual economic variables.
Third, even if there were no aggregated economic effects, a criticism might be that the find-
ings for imports and exports only represent a broader globalization trend, which also includes
the political and social realm. We use the measures for de facto political and social globaliza-
tion of the KOF index to test this argument. We run two models each with political globaliza-
tion and social globalization as a covariate and a third model with economic, political and
social globalization combined (S6 Table). The estimates are not significant in any of these
models. We cannot reject the null of no effects of political and social globalization on the cen-
ter of gravity and interpret this as evidence that the significant estimates for imports and
exports are genuine economic effects and do not reflect a broader globalization effect.
Fourth, the effect of economic variables on party systems is difficult to identify because of
the interplay of the dimensions of economic globalization and because economic variables,
public opinion and party behavior are interrelated in ways that we cannot properly model in
an observational setting. We have formulated causal hypotheses on the causal effect of globali-
zation and party systems and the underlying mechanisms, but the empirical strategy does not
allow us to conclude that the results can be interpreted in causal terms. We have found empiri-
cal associations between the dimensions of economic globalization and the COG that are
indicative of a causal relationship, but it should be kept in mind that the evidence has been
derived from a model-based analysis of observational data that confronts identification issues
[79].
8 Conclusion
Political parties are involved in making decisions about the trajectory of globalization. We
reverse the perspective and present results indicating that imports and exports, as the two
most important facets of economic globalization, might influence the positions that parties
take on an economic dimension of party competition. If correct (see previous section), this has
important empirical consequences for voter representation because the average positioning of
parties reflects the options from which voters can choose. On a more general level, our study
indicates that, as two other salient concepts in the globalization literature, the COG and con-
vergence/divergence are best considered in conjunction to formulate a complete picture.
The estimates of our pooled and dynamic analysis are in discord with previous research
that found no or inconsistent effects of globalization on party positioning using pooled data
[6, 80]. The variation in the findings suggests that one should be careful in making inferences
across levels of analysis, which is parties and party systems for our research topic, to avoid
aggregation problems when making bottom-up inferences and problems of ecological infer-
ence for top-down conclusions. In addition, the findings of our moving-window analysis
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point to the benefits of going beyond a pooled analysis and analyze time-varying effects of
globalization. This is particularly promising when the pooled dataset spans multiple decades
and different globalization episodes and political and economic paradigms. Because of the
challenges to the causal analysis that we addressed in the previous section, our results are best
considered a promising basis for future studies on globalization effects along those lines that
engage in design-based inference to make causal inferences on stronger ground.
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S5 Fig. Country-wise deletion, imports. 1 Austria, 2 Belgium, 3 Cyprus, 4 Denmark, 5 Fin-
land, 6 Germany, 7 Greece, 8 Ireland, 9 Italy, 10 Luxembourg, 11 Netherlands, 12 Portugal, 13
Spain, 14 Sweden, 15 United Kingdom.
(TIF)
S6 Fig. Country-wise deletion, exports. 1 Austria, 2 Belgium, 3 Cyprus, 4 Denmark, 5 Fin-
land, 6 Germany, 7 Greece, 8 Ireland, 9 Italy, 10 Luxembourg, 11 Netherlands, 12 Portugal, 13
Spain, 14 Sweden, 15 United Kingdom.
(TIF)
S7 Fig. Model with trade balance, moving-window analysis. Numbers next to confidence
intervals are observations per regression. We run the moving-window analysis with the trade
balance variable instead of imports and exports to account for multicollinearity in the baseline
model because of the correlation between imports and exports. The results confirm the
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theoretical arguments and findings and the estimates for trade balance display the expected
development. The effects become positively significant during the second subperiod and tend
to get smaller and remain significant in the third subperiod. As before, the confidence intervals
are wide and the coefficient is estimated with relatively large uncertainty.
(TIF)
S8 Fig. De jure trade and financial globalization (one-year lag). Lowess smoother, band-
with = 0.5.
(TIF)
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